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Theories of natural language and concepts have been unable to model the flexibility,
creativity, context-dependence, and emergence, exhibited by words, concepts and
their combinations. The mathematical formalism of quantum theory has instead been
successful in capturing these phenomena such as graded membership, situational
meaning, composition of categories, and also more complex decision making situations,
which cannot be modeled in traditional probabilistic approaches. We show how a formal
quantum approach to concepts and their combinations can provide a powerful extension
of prototype theory. We explain how prototypes can interfere in conceptual combinations
as a consequence of their contextual interactions, and provide an illustration of this
using an intuitive wave-like diagram. This quantum-conceptual approach gives new life
to original prototype theory, without however making it a privileged concept theory, as
we explain at the end of our paper.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Theories of concepts struggle to capture the creative flexibility with which concepts are used in
natural language, and combined into larger complexes with emergent meaning, as well as the
context-dependent manner in which concepts are understood (Geeraerts, 1989). In this paper, we
present some recent advances in our quantum approach to concepts. More specifically, we follow
the general lines illustrated in Gabora and Aerts (2002), Aerts and Gabora (2005a,b), and Gabora
et al. (2008), and generalize the quantum-theoretic model elaborated in Aerts (2009b) and Aerts
et al. (2013a).
According to the “classical,” or “rule-based” view of concepts, which can be traced back to
Aristotle, all instances of a concept share a common set of necessary and sufficient defining
properties. Wittgenstein pointed out that: (i) in some cases it is not possible to give a set of
characteristics or rules defining a concept; (ii) it is often unclear whether an object is a member of
a particular category; (iii) conceptual membership of an instance strongly depends on the context.
A major blow to the classical view came from Rosch’s work on color. This work showed that
colors do not have any particular criterial attributes or definite boundaries, and instances differ
with respect to how typical they are of a concept (Rosch, 1973, 1978, 1983). This led to formulation
of “prototype theory,” according to which concepts are organized around family resemblances, and
consist of characteristic, rather than defining, features. These features are weighted in the definition
of the “prototype.” Rosch showed that subjects rate conceptual membership as “graded,” with
degree of membership of an instance corresponding to conceptual distance from the prototype.
Moreover, the prototype appears to be particularly resistant to forgetting. Prototype theory also
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has the strength that it can be mathematically formulated
and empirically tested. By calculating the similarity between
the prototype of a concept and a possible instance of it,
across all salient features, one arrives at a measure of the
“conceptual distance” between the instance and the prototype.
Another means of calculating conceptual distance comes out
of “exemplar theory” (Nosofsky, 1988, 1992), according to
which a concept is represented by, not a set of defining or
characteristic features, but a set of salient “instances” of it stored
in memory. Exemplar theory has met with considerable success
at predicting empirical results. Moreover, there is evidence of
preservation of specific training exemplars in memory. Classical,
prototype, and exemplar theories are sometimes referred to
as “similarity based” approaches, because they assume that
categorization relies on data-driven statistical evidence. They
have been contrasted with “explanation based” approaches,
according to which categorization relies on a rich body of
knowledge about the world. For example, according to “theory
theory” concepts take the form of “mini-theories” (Murphy and
Medin, 1985) or schemata (Rumelhart and Norman, 1988), in
which the causal relationships among properties are identified.
Although these theories do well at modeling empirical data
when only one concept is concerned, they perform poorly at
modeling combinations of two concepts. As a consequence,
cognitive psychologists are still looking for a satisfactory and
generally accepted model of how concepts combine.
The inadequacy of fuzzy set models of conceptual
conjunctions (Zadeh, 1982) to resolve the “Pet-Fish problem”
identified by Osherson and Smith (1981) highlighted the severity
of the combination problem. People rate the item Guppy as
a very typical example of the conjunction Pet-Fish, without
rating Guppy as a typical example neither of Pet nor of Fish
(“Guppy effect”) (Osherson and Smith, 1981, 1982). Studies
by Hampton on concept conjunctions (Hampton, 1988a),
disjunctions (Hampton, 1988b) and negations (Hampton, 1997)
confirmed that traditional fuzzy set and Boolean logical rules
are violated whenever people combine concepts, as one usually
finds “overextension” and “underextension” in the membership
weights of items with respect to concepts and their combinations.
It has been shown that people estimate a sentence like “x is tall
and x is not tall” as true, in particular when x is a “borderline
case” (“borderline contradictions”) (Bonini et al., 1999; Alxatib
and Pelletier, 2011), again violating the rules of set-theoretic
Boolean logic. The seriousness of the combination problem was
pointed out by various scholars (Komatsu, 1992; Fodor, 1994;
Kamp and Partee, 1995; Rips, 1995; Osherson and Smith, 1997).
More recently, other theories of concepts have been developed,
such as “Costello and Keane’s constraint theory” (Costello and
Keane, 2000), “Dantzig, Raffone, and Hommel’s connectionist
CONCAT model of concepts” (Van Dantzig et al., 2011),
“Thagard and Stewart’s emergent binding model” (Thagard
and Stewart, 2011), and “Gagne and Spalding’s morphological
approach” (Gagne and Spalding, 2009). However, none of these
theories has a strong track record of modeling the emergence
and non-compositionality of concept combinations.
The approach to concepts presented in this paper grew
out earlier work on the application to concept theory on the
axiomatic and operational foundations of quantum theory and
quantum probability (Aerts, 1986; Pitowsky, 1989; Aerts, 1999).
A major theoretical insight was to shift the perspective from
viewing a concept as a “container” to viewing it as “an entity
in a specific state that is changing under the influence of a
context” (Gabora and Aerts, 2002). This allowed us to provide
a solution to the Guppy effect and to successfully represent the
data collected on Pet, Fish and Pet-Fish by using the mathematical
formalism of quantum theory (Aerts andGabora, 2005a,b). Then,
we proved that none of the above experiments in concept theory
can be represented in a single probability space satisfying the
axioms of Kolmogorov (1933). We developed a general quantum
framework to represent conjunctions, disjunctions and negations
of two concepts, which has been successfully tested several times
(Aerts, 2009a,b; Sozzo, 2014, 2015; Aerts et al., 2015a), and
we put forward an explanatory hypothesis for the observed
deviations from traditional logical and probabilistic structures
and for the occurrence of quantum effects in cognition (Aerts
et al., 2015b). We recently identified a strong and systematic
non-classical phenomenon effect, which is deeper than the
ones typically detected in concept combinations and directly
connected with the mechanisms of concept formation (Aerts
et al., 2015c). This work is part of a growing domain of cognitive
psychology that uses the mathematical formalism of quantum
theory and quantum structures to model empirical situations
where the application of traditional probabilistic approaches is
problematical (probability judgments errors, decision-making
errors, violations of expected utility theory, etc.; Aerts and Aerts,
1995; Aerts et al., 2000, 2013a,b, 2014, 2015; Aerts and Sozzo,
2011, 2014; Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Haven and Khrennikov,
2013; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013; Khrennikov et al., 2014;
Wang et al., 2014).
This paper outlines recent progress in the development of a
quantum-theoretic framework for concepts and their dynamics.
Section 2 explains how the “SCoP formalism” can be interpreted
as a “contextual and interfering prototype theory that is a
generalization of standard prototype theory” in which prototypes
are not fixed, but change under the influence of a context, and
interfere as a consequence of their contextual interactions (see
also Gabora et al., 2008; Aerts et al., 2013a). Section 3 presents
an amended explanatory version of the quantum-mechanical
model in complex Hilbert space worked out in Aerts (2009b)
and Aerts et al. (2013a) for the typicality of items with respect
to the concepts Fruits and Vegetables, and their disjunction
Fruits or Vegetables. This improved quantum model illustrates
how the prototype of Fruits (Vegetables) changes under the
influence of the context Vegetables (Fruits) in the combination
Fruits or Vegetables. The latter combination is represented using
the quantum-mathematical notion of linear superposition in
a complex Hilbert space, which entails the genuine quantum
effect of “interference.” Hence, our model shows that the
prototypes of Fruits and Vegetables interfere in the disjunction
Fruits or Vegetables. Sections 2, 3 also justify the fact that our
quantum-theoretic framework for concepts can be considered as
a “contextual and interfering generalization of original prototype
theory.” The presence of linear superposition and interference
could suggest that concepts combine and interact like waves do.
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In Section 4 we develop this intuition in detail and propose
an intuitive wave-like illustration of the disjunction Fruits or
Vegetables. Finally, Section 5 discusses connections between
the quantum-theoretic approach to concepts presented here,
and other theories of concepts. Although this approach can be
interpreted as a specific generalization of prototype theory, it is
compatible with insights from other theories of concepts.
We stress that our investigation does not deal with the
elaboration of a “specific typicality model” that represents
a given set of data on the concepts Fruits, Vegetables, and
their disjunction Fruits or Vegetables. We inquire into the
mathematical formalism of quantum theory as a general,
unitary and coherent formalism to model natural concepts. Our
quantum-theoretic model in Section 3 has been derived from this
general quantum theory, hence it satisfies specific technical and
general epistemological constraints of quantum theory. As such,
it does not apply to any arbitrary set of experimental data. Our
formalism exactly applies to those data that exhibit a peculiar
deviation from classical set-theoretic modeling; such deviations
are taken in our framework as indicative of interference and
emergence. Data collected on combinations of two concepts
systematically exhibit deviations from classical set-theoretical
modeling, and traditional probabilistic approaches have difficulty
coping with this. In this sense, the success of the quantum-
theoretic modeling can be interpreted as a confirmation of
the effectiveness of quantum theory to model conceptual
combinations. We should also mention that our quantum-
theoretic approach has recently produced new predictions,
allowing us to identify entanglement in concept combinations
(Aerts and Sozzo, 2011, 2014), and systematic deviations from
the marginal law, deeply connected to the mechanisms of
concept formation (Aerts et al., 2015a,c). These effects would
not have been identified in a more traditional investigation of
overextension and underextension.
It follows from the above analysis that our quantum-
theoretic modeling rests on a “theory based approach,” as it
straightforwardly derives from quantum theory as “a theory to
represent natural concepts.” Hence, it should be distinguished
from an “ad-hoc modeling based approach,” only devised to
fit data. One should be suspicious of models in which free
parameters are added after the fact on an ad-hoc basis to fit
the data more closely. In our opinion, the fact that our “theory
derived model” reproduces different sets of experimental data is
a convincing argument to support its advantage over traditional
modeling approaches and to extend its use to more complex
combinations of concepts.
2. THE SCoP FORMALISM AS A
CONTEXTUAL INTERFERING PROTOTYPE
THEORY
This section summarizes the SCoP approach to concepts by
providing new insights to the research in Aerts and Gabora
(2005a,b) and Gabora et al. (2008).
We mentioned in Section 1 that, according to prototype
theory, concepts are associated with a set of characteristic,
rather than defining, features (or properties), that are weighted
in the definition of the prototype. A new item is categorized
as an instance of the concept if it is sufficiently similar
to this prototype (Rosch, 1973, 1978, 1983). The original
prototype theory was subsequently put into mathematical
form as follows. The prototype consists of a set of features
{a1, a2, . . . , aM}, with associated “weights” (or “application
values”) {xp1, xp2, . . . , xpM}, where M is the number of features
that are considered. A new item k is also associated with a
set {xk1, xk2, . . . , xkM}, where the number xkm refers to the
applicability of the m-th feature to the item k (for a given
stimulus). Then, the conceptual distance between the item k and
the prototype, defined as
dk =
√√√√ M∑
m= 1
(xkm − xpm)2 (1)
is a measure of the similarity between item and prototype. The
smaller the distance dk for the item k, the more representative k
is of the given concept.
Prototype theory was developed in response to findings that
people rate conceptual membership as graded (or fuzzy), with
the degree of membership of an instance corresponding to the
conceptual distance from the prototype. A second fundamental
element of prototype theory is that it can in principle be
confronted with empirical data, e.g., membership or typicality
measurements.
A fundamental challenge to prototype theory (but also to
any other theory of concepts) has become known as the “Pet-
Fish problem.” The problem can be summarized as follows. We
denote by Pet-Fish the conjunction of the concepts Pet and Fish.
It has been shown that people rate Guppy neither as a typical Pet
nor as a typical Fish, they do rate it as a highly typical Pet-Fish
(Osherson and Smith, 1981). This phenomenon of the typicality
of a conjunctive concept being greater than—or overextends—
that of either of its constituent concepts has also been called
the “Guppy effect.” Using classical logic, or even fuzzy logic,
there is no specification of a prototype for Pet-Fish starting from
the prototypes of Pet and Fish that is consistent with empirical
data (Osherson and Smith, 1981, 1982; Zadeh, 1982). Fuzzy set
theory falls short because standard connectives for conceptual
conjunction involve typicality values that are less than or equal to
each of the typicality values of the conceptual components, i.e.,
the typicality of an item such as Guppy is not higher for Pet-Fish
than for either Pet or Fish.
Similar effects occur for membership weights of items
with respect to concepts and their combinations. Hampton’s
experiments indicated that people estimate membership in such
a way that the membership weight of an item for the conjunction
(disjunction) of two concepts, calculated as the large number
limit of relative frequency of membership estimates, is higher
(lower) than the membership weight of this item for at least one
constituent concept (Hampton, 1988a,b). This phenomenon is
referred to as “overextension” (“underextension”). “Double
overextension” (“double underextension”) is also an
experimentally established phenomenon, when the membership
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weight with respect to the conjunction (disjunction) of two
concepts is higher (lower) than the membership weights with
respect to both constituent concepts (Hampton, 1988a,b).
Furthermore, conceptual negation does not satisfy the rules
of classical Boolean logic (Hampton, 1997). More, Bonini
et al. (1999), and Alxatib and Pelletier (2011), identified the
presence of “borderline contradictions,” directly connected
with overextension, namely, a sentence like “John is tall and
John is not tall” is estimated as true by a significant number
of participants, again violating basic rules of classical Boolean
logic. More generally, for each of these experimental data, a
single classical probability framework satisfying the axioms
of Kolmogorov does not exist (Aerts, 2009a,b; Aerts et al.,
2013a,b, 2015a; Sozzo, 2014, 2015). To clarify the latter sentence
no single probability space can be constructed for an item
whose membership weight with respect to the conjunction of
two concepts is overextended with respect to both constituent
concepts.
These problems—compositionality, the graded nature of
typicality, and the probabilistic nature of membership weights—
present a serious challenge to any theory of concepts.
We have developed a novel theoretical model of concepts
and their combinations (Gabora and Aerts, 2002; Aerts and
Gabora, 2005a,b), conjunction (Aerts, 2009a; Aerts et al.,
2013a, 2015a; Sozzo, 2014, 2015), disjunction (Aerts, 2009a;
Aerts et al., 2013a), conjunction and negation (Aerts et al.,
2015a; Sozzo, 2015). It uses the mathematical formalism of
quantum theory in Hilbert space to represent data on conceptual
combinations, which has been successfully tested several times.
This quantum-conceptual approach enables us to model the
above-mentioned deviations from classicality in terms of genuine
quantum phenomena (contextuality, emergence, entanglement,
interference, and superposition), thus capturing fundamental
aspects of how concepts combine. More importantly, we have
recently identified stronger deviations from classicality than
overextension and underextension, which unveil, in our opinion,
deep non-classical aspects of concept formation (Aerts et al.,
2015c).
The approach was inspired by similarity based theories, such
as prototype theory, in several respects:
(i) a fundamentally probabilistic formalism is needed to
represent concepts and their dynamics;
(ii) the typicality of different items with respect to a concept is
context-dependent;
(iii) features (or properties) of a concept vary in their
applicability.
A key insight underlying our approach is considering a concept
as, not a “container of instantiations” but, rather, an “entity in a
specific state,” which changes under the influence of a context. In
our quantum-conceptual approach, a context is mathematically
modeled as quantum physics models of a measurement on a
quantum particle. The (cognitive) context changes the state of a
concept in the way a measurement in quantum theory changes
the state of a quantum particle (Aerts and Gabora, 2005a,b).
For example, in our modeling of the concept Pet, we considered
the context e expressed by Did you see the type of pet he has?
This explains that he is a weird person, and found that when
participants in an experiment were asked to rate different items of
Pet, the scores for Snake and Spiderwere very high in this context.
In this approach, this is explained by introducing different states
for the concept Pet. We call “the state of Pet when no specific
context is present” its ground state pˆ. The context e changes
the ground state pˆ into a new state pweird person pet . Typicality
here is an observable semantic quantity, which means that it
takes different values in different states of the concept. As a
consequence, a substantial part of the typicality variations that
are encountered in the Guppy effect are due to, e.g., changes
of state of the concept Pet under the influence of a context.
More specifically, the typicality variations for the conjunction
Pet-Fish are in great part similar to the typicality variations for
Pet under the context Fish (and also for Fish under the context
Pet). Not only does context play a role in shaping the typicality
variations for Pet-Fish, but also interference between Pet and Fish
contributes, as we will analyze in detail in Section 3.
In general, whenever someone is asked to estimate the
typicality of Guppy with respect to the concept Pet in the absence
of any context, it is the typicality in the ground state pˆPet that
is obtained, and whenever the typicality of Guppy is estimated
with respect to the concept Fish in the absence of any context,
it is the typicality in the ground state pˆFish that is obtained. But,
whenever someone is asked to estimate the typicality of Guppy
with respect to the conjunction Pet-Fish, it is the typicality in
a new ground state pˆPet−Fish that is obtained. This new ground
state pˆPet−Fish is different from pˆPet as well as from pˆFish. It is close
but not equal to the changed state of the ground state pˆPet under
the context eFish, and close but not equal to the changed state of
the ground state pˆFish under the context ePet , the difference being
due to interference taking place between Pet and Fish when they
combine into Pet-Fish (see Section 3). The “changes of state under
the influence of a context” and corresponding typicalities behave
like the changes of state and corresponding probabilities behave
in quantum theory, giving rise to a violation of corresponding
fuzzy set and/or classical probability rules. This partly explains
the high typicality of Guppy in the conjunction Pet-Fish, and its
normal typicality in Pet and Fish, and the reason why we identify
the Guppy effect as an effect at least partly due to context. There
is also an interference effect, as we will see later.
We developed this approach in a formal way, and called the
underlying mathematical structure a “State Context Property
(SCoP) formalism” (Aerts and Gabora, 2005a). Let A denote a
concept. In SCoP, A is associated with a triple of sets, namely
the set 6 of states—we denote states by p, q, . . ., the set M
of contexts, we denote contexts by e, f , . . ., and the set L of
properties—we denote properties by a, b, . . .. The “ground state”
pˆ of the concept A is the state where A is not under the influence
of any particular context. Whenever A is under the influence
of a specific context e, a change of the state of A occurs. In
case A was in its ground state pˆ, the ground state changes to
a state p. The difference between states pˆ and p is manifested,
for example, by the typicality values of different items of the
concept, as we have seen in the case of the Guppy effect, and
the applicability values of different properties being different in
the two states pˆ and p. Hence, to complete the mathematical
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construction of SCoP, also two functions µ and ν are needed.
The function µ : 6 × M × 6 −→ [0, 1] is defined such
that µ(q, e, p) is the probability that state p of concept A under
the influence of context e changes to state q of concept A. The
function ν : 6 × L −→ [0, 1] is defined such that ν(p, a) is the
weight, or normalization of applicability, of property a in state
p of concept S. The function µ mainly accounts for typicality
measurements, the function ν mainly accounts for applicability
measurements. Through these mathematical structures the SCoP
formalism captures both “contextual typicality” and “contextual
applicability” (Aerts and Gabora, 2005a).
A quantum representation in a complex Hilbert space of data
on Pet and Fish and different states of Pet and Fish in different
contexts was developed (Aerts and Gabora, 2005a), as well as of
the concept Pet-Fish (Aerts and Gabora, 2005b). Let us deepen
the connections between the quantum-theoretic approach to
concepts and prototype theory (see also Gabora et al., 2008).
This approach can be interpreted in a rather straightforward way
as a generalization of prototype theory which mathematically
integrates context and formalizes its effects, unlike standard
prototype theory. What we call the ground state of a concept
can be seen as the prototype of this concept. The conceptual
distance of an item from the prototype can be reconstructed
from the functions µ and ν in the SCoP formalism. Thus, as
long as individual concepts are considered and in the absence of
any context, prototype theory can be embodied into the SCoP
formalism, and the prototype of a concept A can be represented
as its ground state pˆA. However, any context will change this
ground state into a new state. An important consequence of
this is that when the concept is in this new state, the prototype
changes. An intuitive way of understanding this is to consider this
new state a new “contextualized prototype.” More concretely, the
concept Pet, when combined with Fish in the conjunction Pet-
Fish, has a new contextualized prototype, which could be called
“Pet contextualized by Fish.” The new state can be thought of
as a “contextualized prototype.” Hence, this is a prototype-like
theory that is capable of mathematically describing the presence
and influence of context. From the point of view of conceptual
distance, this contextualized prototype will be close to, e.g.,
Guppy.
The interpretation of the SCoP formalism as a contextual
prototype theory can be applied not just to conjunctions and
disjunctions of two concepts, but also to abstract categories such
as Fruits. It is very likely that the prototype of Fruits is close to,
e.g., Apple, or Orange. But let us now consider the combination
Tropical Fruits, that is, Fruits under the contextTropical. It is then
reasonable to maintain that the new contextualized prototype of
Tropical Fruits is closer to, e.g., Pineapple, or Mango, than to
Apple, or Orange. The introduction of contextualized prototypes
within the SCoP formalism enables us to incorporate abstract
categories as well as deviations of typicality from fuzzy set
behavior.
Another interesting aspect of this approach to prototype
theory comes to light if we consider again the conceptual
combination Pet-Fish. It is reasonable that the prototypes of
Pet and Fish—ground states pˆPet and pˆFish—interfere in Pet-Fish
whenever the typicality of an item, e.g., Guppy, is measured
with respect to Pet-Fish. This sentence cannot, however, be
made more explicit in the absence of a concrete quantum-
theoretic representation of typicality measurements of items with
respect to concepts and their combinations. Indeed, interference
and superposition effects can be precisely formalized in such
quantum representation. This will be the content of Sections 3
and 4.
3. A HILBERT SPACE MODELING OF
MEMBERSHIP MEASUREMENTS
One can gain insight into how people combine concepts by
gathering data on “membership weights” and “typicalities.” To
obtain data on “typicalities,” participants are given a concept,
and a list of instances or items, and asked to estimate their
typicality on a Likert scale. In other experiments participants are
asked to choose which instance they consider most typical of the
concept. Averages of these estimates or relative frequencies of the
picked items give rise to values representing the typicalities of
the respective items. A membership weight is obtained by asking
participants to estimate the membership of specific items with
respect to a concept. This estimation can be quantified using the
7-point Likert scale and then converted into a relative frequency,
and then into a probability called the “membership weight.”
Hampton used membership weights instead of typicalities
(Hampton, 1988b), because all you can do with typicalities is
fuzzy set type calculations: the minimum rule of fuzzy sets for
conjunction or the maximum rule for disjunction. This approach
has many serious shortcomings; indeed the Pet-Fish problem
could not be addressed by it. More serious failures are revealed
by membership weight data. Hampton measured “membership
weights” and “degrees of non-membership or membership,”
making these two measurements in one experiment. More
specifically, Hampton’s experiment generates magnitude data,
measuring the “degree of membership or non-membership”
using a 7-point Likert scale providing −1, −2, −3 for degrees
of non-membership, 1, 2, 3 for degrees of membership and, 0
for borderline cases. From the same experiment membership
weight data are obtained, with 8 possible triplets [±,±,±] per
item. Each triplet indicating with a + whether the participant
considered item k to be a member of the first category (A), the
second category (B) and the third disjunction category (A orB),
and with a − respectively otherwise. In the present Hilbert space
model we use the “degree of membership or non-membership”
values obtained by Hampton, add +3 to them to make them all
non-negative, sum them, and divide each one by this sum. Since
there are 24 items in total, in this way we get a set of 24 values in
the interval [0,1], that sum up to 1. We will use these values as a
substitute for membership collapse probabilities.
Let us first explain how we arrive at the membership collapse
probabilities as a consequence of a measurement, and why we
can use the above-mentioned calculated values of “degree of
membership or non-membership” as substitutes. Suppose that
instead of using the data obtained by Hampton, we performed
the following experiment. For each pair of concepts and their
combination we ask the participant to select one and only one
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 418
Aerts et al. Generalizing Prototype Theory
item that they consider the best choice for membership. Then
we calculate for each of the 24 items the relative frequency of
its appearance. These relative frequencies are 24 values in the
interval [0,1] summing up to 1, and their limits for increasing
numbers of participants represent the probabilities for each
item to be chosen as the best member. These probabilities are
what in a quantum model are called the “membership collapse
probabilities.” Of course, the above described experiment to
determine the membership collapse probabilities has not been
performed. However, the values calculated from Hampton’s
measurement of “degree of membership or non-membership,”
after renormalization as explained above, are expected to
correlate with what these membership collapse probabilities
would be if they were measured. This is why we use them
as substitutes for the membership collapse probabilities in our
quantum model. As we will see when we construct the quantum
model, the exact values of the substitutes for the membership
collapse probabilities are not critical. Thus, if we can model the
substitutes for the membership collapse probabilities calculated
from Hampton’s data, we can also model the actual membership
collapse probabilities (the data we would have if the experiment
had been done).
So, we repeat, in Table 1, Hampton’s experimental data
(Hampton, 1988b) have been converted into relative frequencies.
The “degrees of non-membership and degrees of membership”
give rise to µk(X) and now stand for the probability of concepts
Fruits (X = A), Vegetables (X = B) and Fruits or Vegetables
(X = “A or B”) to collapse to the item k, and thus add up to
1, that is,
24∑
k= 1
µk(A) =
24∑
k= 1
µk(B) =
24∑
k= 1
µk(A or B) = 1 (2)
for the 24 items. The quantum model for concepts and their
disjunction in complex Hilbert space is developed by building
appropriate state vectors and projection operators for a given
ontology of 24 items of two more abstract “container” concepts.
In our model, the Hilbert space is a complex n-dimensional
C
n, in which state vectors are n-dimensional complex numbered
vectors. We use the “bra-ket” notation – respectively 〈·| and |·〉—
for vector states (see the Appendix for further explanation). The
complex conjugate transpose of the |·〉 ket-vector (nx1 dim.) is
the 〈·| bra-vector (1xn dim.). Projectors and operators are then
combined as matrices |·〉〈·|, while scalars are obtained by inner
product 〈·|·〉. We represent the measurement, consisting in the
question “Is item k a good example of concept X?,” by means of
an orthogonal projection operatorMk. Each self-adjoint operator
in the Hilbert spaceH has a spectral decomposition on {Mk|k =
1, . . . , 24}, where each Mk is the projector corresponding to
item k from the list of 24 items in Table 1. A priori we set
no restrictions to the dimension of the complex Hilbert space,
and thus neither to the projection space of the operators Mk.
Each separate concept Fruits and Vegetables is now represented
by its proper state vector |A〉 and |B〉 respectively, while their
disjunction Fruits or Vegetables is realized by their equiponderous
superposition 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉). It is precisely this feature of the
model—its ability to represent combined concepts as superposed
states—that provides the interferential composition of what
could not be classically composed using sets.
Following the standard rule of average outcome values of
quantum theory, the probabilities, µk(A), µk(B) and µk(A or B)
are given by:
µk(A) = 〈A|Mk|A〉 (3)
µk(B) = 〈B|Mk|B〉 (4)
µk(A or B) =
〈A| + 〈B|√
2
Mk
|A〉 + |B〉√
2
(5)
After a straightforward calculation, the membership probability
expression µk(A or B) becomes:
µk(A or B) =
1
2
(〈A|Mk|A〉 + 〈A|Mk|B〉 + 〈B|Mk|A〉
+ 〈B|Mk|B〉)
= 1
2
(
µk(A)+ µk(B)
)+ℜ〈A|Mk|B〉 (6)
where ℜ takes the real part of 〈A|Mk|B〉. This expression
shows the contribution of the interference term ℜ〈A|Mk|B〉
in µk(A or B) with respect to the “classical average” term
1
2
(
µk(A)+ µk(B)
)
. It consists of the real part of the complex
probability amplitude of the k-th item in Vegetables (concept |B〉)
to be the one in Fruits (concept |A〉).
The quantum concept model imposes the orthogonality of the
state vectors corresponding to different concepts. Therefore, we
have for the states of Fruits and Vegetables,
〈A|B〉 = 0. (7)
Each different item of the projector Mk also provides an
orthogonal projection space. Since the conceptual disjunction
Fruits or Vegetables spans a subspace of 2 dimensions in the
complex Hilbert space (along the rays of |A〉 and |B〉), we set forth
the possibility for a complex 2-dimensional subspace for each
item. This brings the dimension of the complex Hilbert space to
48. However, we will choose the unit vectors of these subspaces
in such a way as to eliminate redundant dimensions whenever
possible. Each category vector is built on orthogonal unit vectors,
defined by the projection operators Mk. i.e., we define |ek〉 the
unit vector on Mk|A〉, and define |fk〉 the unit vector on Mk|B〉.
Thus, each item is now represented by a vector spanned by
|ek〉 and |fk〉. Due the orthogonality of the projectors Mk, we
have
〈ek|fl〉 = δklckeiγk (8)
where the Kronecker δkl = 1 for same indices and zero otherwise,
i.e., different item states are orthogonal as well. And ck expresses
the angle between the two unit vectors |ek〉 and |fk〉 of each
2-dimensional subspace of item k. Notice that should some ck
be 1, then the required dimension of the complex Hilbert space
diminishes by 1, since the vectors |ek〉 and |fk〉 then coincide—
a property that we will use to minimize the size of the required
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TABLE 1 | Membership collapse probability values µk (X) of 24 items for the categories Fruits, Vegetables, and Fruits or Vegetables (Hampton, 1988b).
A = FRUITS B = VEGETABLES
k Item µk (A) µk (B) µk (A or B) λk λ-rank ǫk φk
1 Almond 0.0359 0.0133 0.0269 0.0217 16 +1 84.0◦
2 Acorn 0.0425 0.0108 0.0249 0.0214 17 −1 −94.5◦
3 Peanut 0.0372 0.0220 0.0269 0.0285 10 −1 −95.4◦
4 Olive 0.0586 0.0269 0.0415 0.0397 9 +1 91.9◦
5 Coconut 0.0755 0.0125 0.0604 0.0260 12 +1 57.7◦
6 Raisin 0.1026 0.0170 0.0555 0.0415 7 +1 95.9◦
7 Elderberry 0.1138 0.0170 0.0480 0.0404 8 −1 −113.3◦
8 Apple 0.1184 0.0155 0.0688 0.0428 5 +1 87.6◦
9 Mustard 0.0149 0.0250 0.0146 0.0186 19 −1 −105.9◦
10 Wheat 0.0136 0.0255 0.0165 0.0184 20 +1 99.3◦
11 Root Ginger 0.0157 0.0323 0.0385 0.0172 22 +1 49.9◦
12 Chili Pepper 0.0167 0.0446 0.0323 0.0272 11 −1 −86.4◦
13 Garlic 0.0100 0.0301 0.0293 0.0146 23 −1 −57.6◦
14 Mushroom 0.0140 0.0545 0.0604 0.0087 24 +1 18.5◦
15 Watercress 0.0112 0.0658 0.0482 0.0253 13 −1 −69.1◦
16 Lentils 0.0095 0.0713 0.0338 0.0252 14 +1 104.7◦
17 Green Pepper 0.0324 0.0788 0.0506 0.0503 4 −1 −95.7◦
18 Yam 0.0533 0.0724 0.0541 0.0615 3 +1 98.1◦
19 Tomato 0.0881 0.0679 0.0688 0.0768 1 +1 98.5◦
20 Pumpkin 0.0797 0.0713 0.0579 0.0733 2 −1 −103.5◦
21 Broccoli 0.0143 0.1284 0.0642 0.0423 6 −1 −99.5◦
22 Rice 0.0140 0.0412 0.0248 0.0238 15 −1 −96.7◦
23 Parsley 0.0155 0.0266 0.0308 0.0178 21 −1 −61.1◦
24 Black Pepper 0.0127 0.0294 0.0222 0.01929 18 +1 86.7◦
Notice also the membership collapse probabilities for Mustard and Pumpkin still show the mark of double underextension of the disjunction. Membership collapse probability data with
δµ ≈ 10−4 entail phase data δφ ≈ 2 · 10−1 and lambda data δλ ≈ 4 · 10−4.
Hilbert space. Should ck be different from 1, then |ek〉 and |fk〉
span a subspace of 2 dimensions. The state vectors |A〉 and |B〉
of the concepts can then be expressed as a superposition of the
vectors |ek〉 and |fk〉 for the items:
|A〉 =
24∑
k= 1
ake
iαk |ek〉, |B〉 =
24∑
k= 1
bke
iβk |fk〉 (9)
where ak, bk, αk, βk ∈ R.
We can express their inner product as follows:
〈A|B〉 =
(
24∑
k= 1
ake
−iαk〈ek|
)(
24∑
l= 1
ble
iβl |fl〉
)
=
24∑
k= 1
akbkcke
i(βk−αk+γk) =
24∑
k= 1
akbkcke
iφk
where we have defined phase φk as φk: = βk − αk + γk in the last
step. The membership probabilities given in Equations (3 and 4)
and the interference terms in Equation (6) can be expanded on
the projection spaces of the items:
µk(A) =
(
24∑
l= 1
ale
−iαl 〈el|
)
(ake
iαk |ek〉) = a2k (10)
µk(B) =
(
24∑
l= 1
ble
−iβl〈fl|
)
(bke
iβk |fk〉) = b2k (11)
〈A|Mk|B〉 =
(
24∑
l= 1
ale
−iαl 〈el|
)
Mk|
(
24∑
m= 1
bme
iβm |fm〉
)
= akbkei(βk−αk)〈ek|fk〉 = akbkckeiφk (12)
Notice that the phase of the k-th component of the conceptual
disjunction is not at play in the interference term 〈A|Mk|B〉
(Equation 6). Taking the real part of the interference term in
Equation (12), we can rewrite the membership probability of the
disjunction in Equation (6) as follows:
µk(A or B) =
1
2
(
µk(A)
+ µk(B)
)+ ck√µk(A)µk(B) cosφk (13)
Rearranging this equation we now choose φk must satisfy
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cosφk =
µk(A or B)− 12 (µk(A)+ µk(B))
ck
√
µk(A)µk(B)
(14)
Since all the membership probabilities on the right side are
fixed, the only remaining free parameters are the coefficients
ck. These parameters must now be tuned in order to satisfy
the orthogonality of |A〉 and |B〉. Using the expansion on the
unit vector sets {|ek〉}, {|fk〉} we obtain for their orthogonality
(Equation 7):
24∑
k= 1
ck
√
µ(A)kµ(B)k cosφk = 0, (15)
24∑
k= 1
ck
√
µ(A)kµ(B)k sinφk = 0. (16)
The “cosine sum” (Equation 15) is automatically satisfied due to
the definition of cosφk and the normalization of membership
probabilities (Equation 2). This can be seen by substituting
the expression of cosφk in Equation (14) and then applying
the normalization condition of the membership probabilities
(Equation 2). The “sine sum” equation still needs to be satisfied.
With the defining relation (Equation 14) of φk, and sinφk =
ǫk
√
1− cos2 φk, where ǫk = ± provides the sign, this becomes1
24∑
k= 1
ǫk
√
c2
k
µk(A)µk(B)− (µk(A or B)−
1
2
(µk(A)+ µk(B)))2
= 0. (17)
In order to satisfy this equation a simple algorithm was devised
(Aerts, 2009a). For convenience of notation we denote the square
root expression, with ck = 1, by a separate symbol:
λk: =
√
µk(A)µk(B)− (µk(A or B)−
1
2
(µk(A)+ µk(B)))2.
(18)
First, we order the values λk from large to small and then assign
a sign ǫk to each of them in such a way that each next partial
sum (increasing index) remains smallest. The λ-ranking with
corresponding values have been tabulated in Table 1. We assign
index m to the item with the largest λ-value. In the present case,
the item Tomato has the largest value, 0.07679.
We now adopt an optimized complex Hilbert space for our
model in which ck = 1 (k 6= m), which reduces the space
to 25 complex dimensions. We again note that all items except
Tomato receive a 1-dimensional complex subspace, whileTomato
is represented by a 2-dimensional subspace. The “sine sum”
equation in Equation (17) can be written as
24∑
k= 1,k 6=m
ǫkλk + ǫm
√
c2mµm(A)µm(B)− (µm(A or B)
− 12 (µm(A)+ µm(B)))2
= 0.
(19)
1The cosine value only defines the phase up to its absolute value |φk|. Thus, the
sign of the sine value is undefined. If ǫk = −1, then φk = −|φk|.
Next, we define the partial sum of the λk according a scheme of
signs ǫk such that from large to small the next ǫkλk is added to
make the sum smaller but not negative.
Sj =
j∑
size ordered λi
ǫiλi (20)
Sj+1 = Sj − λj+1 and ǫj+1 = −1, if Sj − λj+1 ≥ 0 (21)
= Sj + λj+1 and ǫj+1 = +1, if Sj − λj+1 < 0 (22)
The first summand is thus λm, with ǫm = +1. Finally this
procedure leads to
S24 =
24∑
k= 1
ǫkλk ≥ 0
In the Fruits and Vegetables example with membership
probability data in Table 1, this procedure gives:
S24 = 0.0154 (23)
In general the “sine sum” equation then becomes
S24 − λm +
√
c2mµm(A)µm(B)− (µm(A or B)
− 12 (µm(A)+ µm(B)))2
= 0. (24)
From which we can fix cm, the remaining ck not equal to 1:
cm =
√
(S24 − λm)2 + (µm(A or B)− 12 (µm(A)+ µm(B)))2
µm(A)µm(B)
(25)
In the present example we obtain the value cm = 0.8032. We
thus have fixed the inner product—or “angle”—of the vectors
|em〉 and |fm〉, and can now write an explicit representation in
the canonical 25 dimensional complex Hilbert space C25. We can
takeMk(H) to be rays of dimension 1 for k 6= m, andMm(H) to
be a 2-dimensional plane spanned by the vectors |em〉 and |fm〉.
We let the space C25 be spanned on the canonical base {1i},
i ∈ [1 . . . 25]. All items k 6= m are represented by the respective
1i. While for k = m we express the projections of |A〉 and |B〉 by
Mm(H) accordingly on 1m and 125
ame
iαm |em〉 = a˜meiαm1 1m + a˜25eiαm2 125 (26)
bme
iβm |fm〉 = b˜meiβm1 1m + b˜25eiβm2 125 (27)
with a˜m, b˜m, a˜25, b˜25 ∈ R to be specified. The parameters in
these expressions should satisfy the inner product (Equation 8)
for k, l = m
ambm〈em|fm〉 = a˜mb˜me−i(αm1−βm1 ) + a˜25b˜25e−i(αm2−βm2 ),(28)
= ambmcmei(γm−αm+βm) (29)
and the probability weights for k = m
a2m = a˜2m + a˜225, (30)
b2m = b˜2m + b˜225. (31)
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Finally, the representation of all vectors of the items can now
be rendered explicit by simply choosing αk = γk = 0, and
thus βk = φk, ∀k. A further simplification for Tomato is done
by setting a˜25 = 0, which also allows free choice of βm2 = 0.
Then a˜m = am and b˜m = bmcm, and b˜25 = bm
√
(1− c2m).
We have rendered explicit these membership probabilities and
phases in Table 1. Thus we can write the vectors |A〉 and |B〉
in C25 Hilbert space corresponding to the categories Fruits and
Vegetables respectively.
|A〉 = (0.1895, 0.2062, 0.1929, 0.2421, 0.2748, 0.3203, 0.3373,
0.3441, 0.1221, 0.1166, 0.1253, 0.1292, 0.1000, 0.1183,
0.1058, 0.0975, 0.1800, 0.2309, 0.2968, 0.2823, 0.1196,
0.1183, 0.1245, 0.1127, 0.0000) (32)
|B〉 = (0.1153ei84.0◦ , 0.1039e−i94.5◦ , 0.1483e−i95.4◦ , 0.1640ei91.9◦ ,
0.1118ei57.7
◦
, 0.1304ei95.9
◦
, 0.1304e−i113.3
◦
, 0.1245ei87.6
◦
,
0.1581e−i105.9
◦
, 0.1597ei99.3
◦
, 0.1797ei49.9
◦
, 0.2112e−i86.4
◦
,
0.1735e−i57.6
◦
, 0.2335ei18.5
◦
, 0.2565e−i69.1
◦
, 0.2670ei104.7
◦
,
0.2807e−i95.7
◦
, 0.2691ei98.0
◦
, 0.2606ei96.8
◦
, 0.2670e−i103.5
◦
,
0.3583e−i99.5
◦
, 0.2030e−i96.7
◦
, 0.1631e−i61.1
◦
, 0.1715ei86.7
◦
,
0.1552). (33)
This completes the quantum model for the membership
probability of items with respect to Fruits, Vegetables and
Fruits or Vegetables. It captures the enigmatic aspects of
conceptual overextension and underextension identified in
Hampton (1988b), explaining them in terms of genuine quantum
phenomena.
Recalling the terminology adopted in Section 2, the unit
vectors |A〉 and |B〉 in Equations (32) and (33) represent the
ground states of the concepts Fruits and Vegetables, respectively.
Equivalently, these unit vectors represent the prototypes of the
concepts Fruits and Vegetables in prototype theory. The unit
vector 1√
2
(|A〉 + |B〉) instead represents the “contextualized
prototype” obtained by combining the prototypes of Fruits
and Vegetables in the disjunction Fruits or Vegetables. If one
now looks at Equation (6), one sees that the prototypes Fruits
and Vegetables interfere in the disjunction Fruits or Vegetables,
and the term ℜ〈A|Mk|B〉 in Equation (6) specifies how much
interference is present when the membership probability of k is
measured.
4. AN ILLUSTRATION OF INTERFERING
PROTOTYPES
In this section we provide an illustration of contextual interfering
prototypes. It is not a complete mathematical representation as
presented in Section 3 but, rather, an illustration that can help
the reader with a non-technical background to have an intuitive
picture of what a contextual prototype is and how contextual
prototypes interfere. Consider the concepts Fruits,Vegetables and
their disjunction Fruits or Vegetables. The contextual prototype of
Fruits can be represented by the x-axis of a plane surrounded by a
cloud containing items, features, etc.—all the contextual elements
connected with the prototype of Fruits. Similarly, the contextual
prototype of Vegetables can be represented by the y-axis of the
same plane surrounded by a cloud containing items, features,
etc.—all the contextual elements connected with the prototype
of Vegetables. How can we represent the contextual prototype of
the disjunction Fruits or Vegetables? Although as we have seen
it cannot be represented in traditional fuzzy set theory, it can be
represented in terms of waves, with peaks and troughs. Indeed,
waves can be summed up in such a way that peaks and troughs of
the combined wave reproduce overextension and underextension
of the data. In other words, waves provide an intuitive geometric
illustration of the interference taking place when contextual
prototypes are combined in concept combination as discussed
in Section 3. For example, let us demonstrate the interference of
the item Almond when its membership probability with respect
to the disjunction Fruits or Vegetables is calculated based on
its membership probabilities for Fruits and for Vegetables. The
membership probabilities for the categories Fruits,Vegetables and
Fruits or Vegetables have been calculated from the Hampton’s
data and are reported in Table 1.
The idea of an illustration would be to show that in addition
to “fuzziness” (as modeled using a fuzzy set-theoretic approach)
there is a “wave structure.” How can we graphically represent
this “wave structure” of a concept? We start from the standard
interference formula of quantum theory, which is the following.
For an arbitrary item k we have
µk(A or B) =
1
2
(µk(A)+ µk(B))+ ck
√
µk(A)µk(B) cosφk.
(34)
Now, we have
φk = βk − αk + γk (35)
where αk is the phase angle connected with µk(A), βk the phase
angle connected to µk(B), and γk the phase angle connected to
〈A|Mk|B〉. This has not yet been emphasized but if one analyses
the rest of the construction in Hilbert space, it is possible to see
that one can always choose γk = 0, which means that, with this
choice, φk becomes the difference in phases βk and αk.
This is all we need to represent the “wave” nature of a concept
in a manner analogous to that of quantum theory. Indeed, it is
the “phase difference” between the waves—their phases being αk
and βk respectively – that we attach to µ(A)k and µ(B)k. They
determine, together with the membership probabilities µ(A)k
and µ(B)k the interference that gives rise to the measured data
for µ(A or B)k.
The choice of the ck is such that only for the biggest value of
λk, which in this case of Tomato, the ck is chosen different from
1. The only choice different from 1, for Tomato, still does not
influence the fact that φk is the difference between βk and αk,
when we decide to choose γk = 0. Let us consider for example
the first item Almond of the list of 24 in Table 1. We have
µ(A)1 = 0.0359 (36)
µ(B)1 = 0.0133 (37)
µ(A or B)1 = 0.0269 (38)
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These are the data measured by Hampton, and also what exists
for the concepts Fruits, Vegetables and their combination Fruits
or Vegetables with respect to membership probability of the item
Almond in the realm where fuzzy set probability appears. These
are the values that do not fit into a model in this realm, and for
which a wave-like realm underneath is necessary. Calculating the
angle φ1 we get
φ1 = 84.0◦ (39)
(see Table 1). This angle is the result of a wave being present
underneath the fuzzy, probability realm for µ(A)1 and µ(B)1,
such that both waves give rise to a difference in phase—where
the crests of one wave meet the troughs of the other—which is
equal to β1 − α1, and is the value of φ1. This can be represented
graphically by attaching a wave pattern toµ(A)1 and another one
toµ(B)1, such that both have a phase difference of 84.0
◦—see also
Figure 1.
Let us apply quantum theory to each of the items apart.
Each item k has a Schrödinger wave function vibrating in the
neighborhood of A, another one vibrating in the neighborhood
of B and a third vibrating in the neighborhood of “A or B,” and
they are related by superposition. We have:
ψAk =
√
µk(A)e
iαk (40)
ψBk =
√
µk(B)e
iβk (41)
ψAorBk =
√
µk(A or B)e
iδk (42)
In each case, this gives us the membership probabilities. Squaring
(multiplying by its complex conjugate), we have
〈ψAk |ψAk 〉 = (ψAk )∗(ψAk ) =
(√
µk(A)e
iαk
)∗ (√
µk(A)e
iαk
)
=
(√
µk(A)e
−iαk
) (√
µk(A)e
iαk
)
=µk(A)ei(α−α)=µk(A) (43)
〈ψBk |ψBk 〉 = (ψBk )∗(ψBk ) =
(√
µk(B)e
iβk
)∗ (√
µk(B)e
iβk
)
=
(√
µk(B)e
−iβk
) (√
µk(B)e
iβk
)
=µk(B)ei(β−β) = µk(B) (44)
〈ψAorBk |ψAorBk 〉 = (ψAorBk )∗(ψAorBk )
=
(√
µk(A or B)e
iδk
)∗ (√
µk(A or B)e
iδk
)
=
(√
µk(A or B)e
−iδk
) (√
µk(A or B)e
iδk
)
= µk(A or B)ei(δ−δ)
= µk(A or B) (45)
If we write the quantum superposition equation for each item we
get
1√
2
(ψAk + ψBk ) = ψAorBk (46)
⇔ 1√
2
(√
µ(A)ke
iαk +
√
µ(B)ke
iβk
)
=
√
µ(A or B)ke
iδ
k (47)
where 1√
2
is a normalization factor. It is the squaring (i.e.,
multiplying each with its complex conjugate) that gives rise to
the interference equation. Let us do this explicitly to see it.
FIGURE 1 | Interference of items Almond, Acorn and Coconut in the
concept Fruits or Vegetables. Elementary oscillatory waves
√
µk (A) cos(x)
and
√
µk (B) cos(x + φk ) are associated to the components of each given item
in Fruits and Vegetables respectively. The weight amplitude of the item in the
disjunction Fruits or Vegetables emerges at the origin of(√
µk (A) cos(x)+
√
µk (B) cos(x + φk )
)
/
√
2.
First we multiply the left hand side with its complex conjugate.
We do the multiplication explicitly writing each step of it,
to see well how the interference formula appears. Hence, we
have
(
1√
2
(√
µk(A)e
iαk +
√
µk(B)e
iβk
))∗ ( 1√
2
(√
µk(A)e
iαk
+
√
µk(B)e
iβk
))
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 418
Aerts et al. Generalizing Prototype Theory
=
(
1√
2
(√
µk(A)e
−iαk +
√
µk(B)e
−iβk
))( 1√
2
(√
µk(A)e
iαk
+
√
µk(B)e
iβk
))
= 1
2
(√
µk(A)e
−iαk+
√
µk(B)e
−iβk
) (√
µk(A)e
iαk+
√
µk(B)e
iβk
)
= 1
2
(√
µk(A)e
−iαk ·
√
µk(A)e
iαk +
√
µk(A)e
−iαk ·
√
µk(B)e
iβk
+
√
µk(B)e
−iβk ·
√
µk(A)e
iαk +
√
µk(B)e
−iβk ·
√
µk(B)e
iβk
)
= 1
2
(µk(A)e
i(αk−αk) +
√
µk(A)µk(B)e
i(βk−αk)
+
√
µk(A)µk(B)e
−i(βk−αk) + µk(B)ei(βk−βk))
we use now that ei(αk−αk) = e0 = 1, ei(βk−βk) = e0 = 1,
ei(βk−αk) = cos(βk − αk) + i sin(βk − αk) and e−i(βk−αk) =
cos(βk − αk)− i sin(βk − αk), to get to the following
= 1
2
(µk(A)+
√
µk(A)µk(B)(cos(βk − αk)+ i sin(βk − αk))
+
√
µk(A)µk(B)(cos(βk − αk)− i sin(βk − αk))+ µk(B))
see that the term in i sin(βk − αk) cancels, to get
= 1
2
(µk(A)+ 2
√
µk(A)µk(B) cos(βk − αk)+ µk(B))
= 1
2
(µk(A)+ µk(B))+
√
µk(A)µk(B) cos(βk − αk) (48)
Let is multiply now the right hand sight of Equation (46) with its
complex conjugate. This gives
=
(√
µk(A or B)e
iδ
k
)∗ (√
µk(A or B)e
iδ
k
)
= µk(A or B) (49)
Hence, we get, as a consequence of squaring (Equation 46),
exactly our interference formula
1
2
(µk(A)+ µk(B))+
√
µk(A)µk(B) cos(βk − αk) = µk(A or B)
(50)
Note that the difference in phase βk − αk between the waves
connected with the item k and A and the item k and B is what
generates the interference. The new wave connected to the item k
and A or B, of which the phase is δ is not influenced by it, is the
amplitude of this new wave which is affected. This is the reason
that interference is visible in the realm where the fuzzy nature
appears, while it is provoked by the realm where the waves occur.
We put forward this “wave nature” aspect of concepts not
just as an illustration, but to help the reader understand the
manner in which such an underlying wave structure increases
substantially the possible ways in which concepts can interact,
as compared to the interaction possibilities in a modeling with
fuzzy set structures. Of course the notion of a “wave” only adds
clarification if we can imagine it to exist in some space-like realm.
This is the case for the type of waves we all know from our
daily physical environment, such as water waves, sound waves or
light waves. The quantum waves of physical quantum particles
can also be made visible in general by looking at probabilistic
detection patterns of these quantum particles on a physical
screen, and noting the typical interference patterns when the
waves interact and the particles are detected on the screen. One
might believe that an analogous situation is not possible for
concepts, because intuitively concepts, unlike quantum particles,
do not exist “inside” space. If we look at things is an operational
way, however, an analysis can be put forward for the quantum
model of the combination of the two concepts, and the graded
structure of collapse probability weights of the 24 items, which
does illustrate the presence of an interference pattern, and as a
consequence reveals the underlying wave structure of concepts
and their interactions. Let us explain how we can proceed to
accomplish such an analysis.
We start by considering Figure 2. We see there the 24 different
items of Table 1 represented by numbered spots in a plane where
a graded pattern, starting with the lightest region around the
spot number 8, which is Apple, systematically becomes darker.
Different numbers of items are situated in spots in regions of
different darkness, for example, number 16, Lentils, is situated
in a spot in the darkest region. Let us explain how the figure
is constructed. The “intensity of light” of a specific region
corresponds to the “weights of the items” with respect to the
concept Fruits in Table 1. Looking at Table 1, it is indeed Apple,
which has the highest weight, equal to 0.1184, and hence is
represented by spot number 8 on Figure 2, in the lightest region.
Next comes Elderberry with weight equal to 0.1134, represented
by spot number 7 on Figure 2, on the border of the lightest
and second lightest region. Next comes Raisin, with weight equal
to 0.1026, represented by spot number 6 on Figure 2, on the
border of the third and the fourth lightest region. Next comes
Tomato, with weight equal to 0.0881, represented by spot number
19 on Figure 2, in the seventh lightest region, etc. last is Lentils,
with weight equal to 0.0095, represented by spot number 16 on
Figure 2, in the one to darkest region. Hence Figure 2 contains a
representation of the values of the collapse probability weights of
the 24 items with respect to the concept Fruits. There is however
more; we can, for example, wonder what the reason is to choose
a representation in a plane? To explain this, turn to Figure 3. Let
us first note with respect to the two figures, although it might not
seem the case at first sight, all the numbered regions are located
at exactly the same spots in both Figures 2, 3, with respect to the
two orthogonal axes that coordinate the plane. What is different
in both figures are the graded structures of lighter to darker
regions, while they are centered around the spot number 8,
representing the itemApple, in Figure 2 they are centered around
the spot number 21, representing the item Broccoli, in Figure 3.
And, effectively, Figure 3 represents analogous to Figure 2 of
the same 24 items, their collapse probability weights, but this
time with respect to the concept Vegetables. This explains why
in Figure 3 the lightest region is the one centered around spot
number 21, representing Broccoli, while the lightest region in
Figure 2 is the one centered around spot number 8, representing
Apple. Indeed, Broccoli is the most characteristic vegetable of the
considered items, while Apple is the most characteristic fruit, if
“characteristic” is measured by the size of the respective collapse
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FIGURE 2 | The probabilities µ(A)k of a person choosing the item k as a “good example” of Fruits are fitted into a two-dimensional quantum wave
function ψA(x, y). The numbers are placed at the locations of the different items with respect to the Gaussian probability distribution |ψA (x, y)|2. This can be seen as a
light source shining through a hole centered on the origin, and regions where the different items are located. The brightness of the light source in a specific region
corresponds to the probability that this item will be chosen as a “good example” of Fruits.
FIGURE 3 | The probabilities µ(B)k of a person choosing the item k as a “good example” of Vegetables are fitted into a two-dimensional quantum
wave function ψB(x, y). The numbers are placed at the locations of the different items with respect to the probability distribution |ψB (x, y)|2. As in Figure 2, it can be
seen as a light source shining through a hole centered on point 21, where Broccoli is located. The brightness of the light source in a specific region corresponds to the
probability that this item will be chosen as a “good example” of Vegetables.
probability, i.e., the probability to choose this item in the course
of the study. What might not seem obvious is that in a plane
it is always possible to find 24 locations for the 24 items such
that a graded structure with center Apple and a second graded
structure with center Broccoli can be defined, fitting exactly also
the other items in their correct value of “graded light to dark,”
corresponding to the collapse probability weights in Table 1.
Such a situation is what we show in Figures 2, 3. It can be
provenmathematically that a solution always exists, although not
a unique one, which means that Figures 2, 3 show one of these
solutions.
We have chosen on purpose the graded structure form light to
dark to be colored yellow, because we can interpret Figures 2, 3
such that an interesting analogy arises between our study of
the 24 items and two concepts Fruits and Vegetables, and
the well-known double slit experiment with light in quantum
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mechanics. It is this analogy that will also directly illustrate the
“wave nature” of concepts. Suppose we consider a plane figuring
in the experiment as a detection screen, and put counters for
quantum light particles, i.e., photons, at the numbered spots
on the plane. Then we send light through a first slit, which
we call the Fruits slit, which is placed in front of the screen.
The slit is placed such that the counters in the spots detect
numbers of photons with fractions to the total number of
photons send equal the collapse probability weights of the items
represented by the respective spots with respect to the concept
Fruits. The light received on the screen would then look like
what is shown in Figure 2. Similarly, with counters placed in
the same spots, we send light through a second slit, which
we call the Vegetable slit. Now the counters detect numbers of
photons with fractions to the total number of photons equal to
the collapse probability weights of the same items with respect to
the concept Vegetables. The light received on the screen would
then look like what is shown in Figure 3. We can obtain the same
figures directly for our psychological study, consisting of each
participant choosing amongst the 24 items the one that he or
she finds most characteristic of Fruits andVegetables respectively.
The relative frequencies of the first choice gives rise to the image
in Figure 2, while the relative frequencies of the second choice
gives rise to the image in Figure 3, if, for example, we wouldmark
each chosen item by a fixed number of yellow light pixels on a
computer screen.
Before we combine the two slits to give rise to interference,
let us specify the mathematics of the quantum mechanical
formalism that underlies the two Figures. The situation
can be represented quantum mechanically by complex
valued Schrödinger wave functions of two real variables
ψA(x, y), ψB(x, y). For the light and the two slits, this situation
is the “interaction of a photon with the two slits.” For the
human participants in the concepts study, this situation is the
“interaction with the two concepts of the mind of a participant.”
We choose for ψA(x, y) and ψB(x, y) quantum wave packets,
such that the radial part for both wave packets is a Gaussian in
two dimensions. Considering Figures 2, 3, we choose the top of
the first Gaussian in the origin where spot number 8 is located,
and the top of the second Gaussian in the point (a, b), where
spot number 21 is located. Hence
ψA(x, y) =
√
DAe
−
(
x2
4σ2Ax
+ y2
4σ2Ay
)
eiSA(x,y)
ψB(x, y) =
√
DBe
−
(
(x−a)2
4σ2Bx
+ (y−b)2
4σ2By
)
eiSB(x,y) (51)
The phase parts of the wave packets eiSA(x,y) and eiSB(x,y) are
determined by two phase fields SA(x, y) and SB(x, y) which will
account for the interference and hence carry the wave nature.
Of course, these phase parts vanish when we multiply each wave
packet with its complex conjugate to find the connection with the
collapse probabilities. Hence,
|ψA(x, y)|2=DAe
−
(
x2
2σ2Ax
+ y2
2σ2Ay
)
|ψB(x, y)|2=DBe
−
(
(x−a)2
2σ2Bx
+ (y−b)2
2σ2By
)
(52)
are the Gaussians to be seen in Figures 2, 3, respectively. Let us
denote by 1k a small surface specifying the spot corresponding
to the item number k in the plane of the two figures. We then
calculate the collapse probabilities of this item k with respect
to the concepts Fruits and Vegetables in a standard quantum
mechanical way as follows
µk(A) =
∫
1k
|ψA(x, y)|2dxdy =
∫
1k
DAe
−
(
x2
2σ2Ax
+ y2
2σ2Ay
)
dxdy
(53)
µk(B) =
∫
1k
|ψB(x, y)|2dxdy =
∫
1k
DBe
−
(
x2
2σ2Bx
+ y2
2σ2By
)
dxdy
(54)
We can prove that the parameters of the Gaussians,
DA, σAx, σAy,DB, σBx, σBy can be determined in such a
way that the above equations come true, and for the images of
Figures 2, 3, exactly as we have done—using an approximation
for the integrals, which we explain later.
If we open both slits it will be the normalized superposition
of the two wave packets that quantummechanically describes the
new situation
ψAorB(x, y) =
1√
2
(ψA(x, y)+ ψB(x, y)) (55)
We have
µk(A or B) =
∫
1k
ψAorB(x, y)
∗ψAorB(x, y)dxdy
= 1
2
(∫
1k
ψA(x, y)
∗ψA(x, y)dxdy+∫
1k
ψB(x, y)
∗ψB(x, y)dxdy
)
+
∫
1k
ℜ(ψA(x, y)∗ψB(x, y))dxdy
= 1
2
(µk(A)+ µk(B))+∫
1k
ℜ(ψA(x, y)∗ψB(x, y))dxdy (56)
Let us calculate
∫
1k
ℜ(ψA(x, y)∗ψB(x, y))dxdy. We have∫
1k
ℜ(ψA(x, y)∗ψB(x, y))dxdy
=
∫
1k

√DAe−
(
x2
4σ2Ax
+ y2
4σ2Ay
)


√DBe−
(
(x−a)2
4σ2Bx
+ (y−b)2
4σ2By
)

ℜ(e−iSA(x,y)eiSB(x,y))dxdy
=
∫
1k

√DADBe−
(
x2
4σ2Ax
+ (x−a)2
4σ2Bx
+ y2
4σ2Ay
+ (y−b)2
4σ2By
)

ℜ(ei(SB(x,y)−SA(x,y)))dxdy
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=
∫
1k

√DADBe−( x
2
4σ2Ax
+ (x−a)2
4σ2Bx
+ y2
4σ2Ay
+ (y−b)2
4σ2By
)


cos(SB(x, y)− SA(x, y))dxdy (57)
We can hence rewrite (Equation 56) in the following way∫
1k
f (x, y) cos θ(x, y)dxdy = fk (58)
where
f (x, y) =
√
DADBe
−
(
x2
4σ2Ax
+ (x−a)2
4σ2Bx
+ y2
4σ2Ay
+ (y−b)2
4σ2By
)
(59)
is a known Gaussian-like function, remember that we have
determined DA, DB, σAx, σAy, σBx, σBy and a and b in choosing
a solution to be seen in Figures 3, 4, and
fk = µk(A or B)−
1
2
(µk(A)+ µk(B)) (60)
are constants for each k determined by the data, and we have
introduced
θ(x, y) = SB(x, y)− SA(x, y) (61)
the field of phase differences of the two quantum wave packets.
This field of phases differences will determine the interference
pattern and it is the solution of the 24 nonlinear Equations in
(58). This set of 24 equations cannot be solved exactly, but even
a general numerical solution is not straightforwardly at reach
within actual optimization programs. We have introduces two
steps of idealization to find a solution. First, we have looked for
a solution where θ(x, y) is a large enough, polynomial in x and y,
more specifically consisting of 24 independent sub-polynomials
that are independent
θ(x, y) = F1 + F2x+ F3y+ F4x2 + F5xy+ F6y2 + F7x3
+ F8x2y+ F9xy2 + F10y3 + F11x4 + F12x3y
+ F13x2y2 + F14xy3 + F15y4 + F16x5 + F17x4y
+ F18x3y2 + F19x2y3 + F20xy4 + F21y5 + F22x6
+ F23x5y+ F24x4y2 (62)
Secondly, we suppose that 1k = 1 is a sufficiently small
square surface such that a good approximation of the integral
in Equation (58)—and it is also the approximation we have used
for the integrals (Equations 53 and 54)—is given by 1 times the
value of the function under the integral in the center of 1. This
transforms the set of 24 nonlinear (Equation 58) into a set of 24
linear equations
1f (xk, yk)θ(xk, yk) = fk (63)
We have solved them for the points (xk, yk) where the 24 items
are located in Figures 2, 3, for 1 = 0.01, which gives us θ(x, y),
and hence also the expression for |ψAorB(x, y)|2 containing the
expected interference term, and we have
|ψAorB(x, y)|2 =
1
2
(|ψA(x, y)|2 + |ψB(x, y)|2)
+|ψA(x, y)ψB(x, y)| cos θ(x, y) (64)
FIGURE 4 | The probabilities µ(A or B)k of a person choosing the item k as a “good example” of Fruits or Vegetables are fitted into the
two-dimensional quantum wave function 1√
2
(ψA(x, y)+ ψB(x, y)), which is the normalized superposition of the wave functions in Figures 2, 3. The
numbers are placed at the locations of the different exemplars with respect to the probability distribution |ψA (x, y)+ ψB (x, y)|2 = 12 (|ψA (x, y)|2 +|ψB (x, y)|2 )
+|ψA (x, y)ψB (x, y)| cos θ (x, y), where θ (x, y) is the quantum phase difference at (x, y). The values of θ (x, y) are given in Table 1 for the locations of the different items. The
interference pattern is clearly visible.
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TABLE 2 | The parameters of the interference pattern solution illustrated in Figure 4.
Parameters of the solution
k item (x, y) coordinates of items Sub-polynomial Coefficients Fk Gaussian Parameters
1 Almond (−7.2826, 3.24347) 1 87.6039 DA 1.18412
2 Acorn (−7.3316, 2.3116) x 2792.02 σAx 5.65390
3 Peanut (−5.2957, 4.56032) y 8425.01 σAy 3.80360
4 Olive (−4.3776, 3.41765) x2 19.36 DB 1.28421
5 Coconut (−5.0322, 1.24573) xy −2139.87 σBx 8.20823
6 Raisin (−2.7149, 0.896651) y2 −7322.26 σBy 2.41578
7 Elderberry (−1.420, 0.487598) x3 −39.2811
8 Apple (0, 0) x2y −55.5263
9 Mustard (1.7978, 7.64549) xy2 586.674
10 Wheat (2.4786, 7.73915) y3 2205.81
11 Root Ginger (2.8164, 7.41004) x4 −2.22868
12 Chili Pepper (3.9933, 7.03549) x3y 4.19408
13 Garlic (4.7681, 7.81803) x2y2 13.3579
14 Mushroom (5.6281, 6.89107) xy3 −72.233
15 Watercress (7.233, 6.67322) y4 −275.834
16 Lentils (8.1373, 6.56281) x5 0.426731
17 Green Pepper (3.8337, 5.55379) x4y 1.58764
18 Yam (1.5305, 4.69497) x3y2 0.582536
19 Tomato (2.4348, 2.42612) x2y3 −1.13167
20 Pumpkin (3.9873, 2.06652) xy4 3.44008
21 Broccoli (10, 4) y5 12.2584
22 Rice (11.6771, 0.392458) x6 −0.00943132
23 Parsley (11.3949, −0.268463) x5y −0.0535881
24 Black Pepper (11.9389, −0.107151) x4y2 −0.200688
The first column lists the different items, and the second column the coordinates of their locations in Figures 2–4. The third column contains the orthogonal set of sub-polynomials used
as first approximation for the phase field θ (x, y), and the fourth column their values. The fifth and sixth columns contain the Gaussian parameters and their values of the solution.
In Figure 4 we have graphically represented this probability
density |ψAorB(x, y)|2. The interference pattern shown in
Figure 4 is very similar to well-known interference patterns of
light passing through an elastic material under stress. In our
case, it is the interference pattern corresponding to “Fruits or
Vegetables” as a contextual, interfering prototype. The numerical
values of the solutions represented in Figures 2–4 are in Table 2.
We have thus completed our illustration of contextual
interfering prototypes. It is, however, important to remember
that this representation is at the subtle level of an illustration,
while the real working representation of contextual interfering
prototypes needs the complete quantum-mechanical formalism.
It can be considered as a pre-representation, exactly as the
wave-like representations by de Broglie and Schrödinger in the
early days of quantum physics can be considered as useful pre-
quantum representations that capture something of the wave
aspects of microscopic particles.
5. DISCUSSION
In this paper we showed that a generalization of prototype theory
can address the “Pet-Fish problem” and related combination
issues. This was done by formalizing the effect of the cognitive
context on the state of a concept using a SCoP formalism (Gabora
and Aerts, 2002; Aerts and Gabora, 2005a,b; Gabora et al.,
2008). We also developed a quantum-theoretic model in complex
Hilbert space to show that, in this contextualized prototype
theory, prototypes can interfere when concepts combine, as
evidenced by data where typicality measurements are performed.
This could then lead one to think that the general quantum
approach to concepts only presupposes a (contextual) prototype
theory. We now explain why this inference is not true.
Let us make more explicit the relationship between our
quantum-conceptual approach and other concept theories, such
as prototype theory, exemplar theory and theory theory. A deeper
analysis shows that our approach is more than a contextual
generalization of prototype theory. Roughly speaking, other
theories make assumptions about the principles guiding the
formation and intuitive representation of a concept in the
human mind. Thus, prototype theory assumes that a concept
is determined by a set of characteristic rather than defining
features, the human mind has a privileged prototype for each
concept, and typicality of a concrete item is determined by its
similarity with the prototype (Rosch, 1973, 1978, 1983). Exemplar
theory assumes instead that a concept is not determined by a
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set of defining or characteristic features but, rather, by a set of
salient instances of it stored in memory (Nosofsky, 1988, 1992).
Theory theory assumes that concepts are determined by “mini-
theories” or schemata, identifying the causal relationships among
properties (Murphy and Medin, 1985; Rumelhart and Norman,
1988). These theories have all mainly been preoccupied with
the question of “what predominantly determines a concept.” We
agree on the relevance of this question, though it is not the
main issue focused on there. Transposed to our approach, these
theories mainly investigate “what predominantly determines the
state of a concept.” Conversely, the main preoccupation of
our approach has been to propose a theory with the following
features:
(i) a well-defined ontology, i.e., a concept is in our approach
an entity capable of different modes of being with respect
to how it influences measurable semantic quantities such as
typicality, membership weight and membership probability,
and these modes are called “states”;
(ii) the capacity to produce theoretical models fitting data on
these measurable semantic quantities.
We seek to achieve (i) and (ii) independent of the question that
is the focus of other theories of concepts. More concretely, and in
accordance with the results of investigations into the question of
“what predominantly determines a concept,” as far as prototype
theory, exemplar theory and theory theory are concerned, we
believe that all approaches are partially valid. The state of a
concept, i.e., its capability of influencing the values of measurable
semantic quantities, such as typicality and membership weight,
is influenced by the set of its characteristic features, but also
by salient exemplars in memory, and in a considerable number
of cases—where more causal aspects are at play—mini-theories
might be appropriate to express this state. It is important that
“a conceptual state is defined and gives rise, together with the
context, to the values of the measurable semantic quantities.” The
fact that the specification of these values can be only probabilistic
is a confirmation that potentiality and uncertainty occur even
if the state is completely known, hence quantum structures are
intrinsically needed.
It follows from the above that resorting and giving new
life to prototype theory does not necessarily entail that
contextual prototype theory is the only possible theory of
concepts for what concerns the question of “what predominantly
determines a concept.” However, we choose to identify our
general approach as a “generalized contextual interfering
prototype theory,” because the “ground state” of a concept is
a fundamental notion of the theory, and this ground state
is what corresponds to the prototype. There is not a similar
affinity with exemplar theory and theory theory. However, the
conceptual state and its interaction with the cognitive context
can potentially capture the other conceptual aspects, exemplars
and schemata, which are instead predominant in alternative
concept theories. In this respect, an interesting analogy must
be emphasized. The quantum-theoretic approach only aims
at modeling concepts and their combinations in a unitary
and coherent mathematical formalism. We do not pretend to
give a universal definition of what a concept is and how it
forms. Using a known analogy in mathematics, we can say that
the quantum-theoretic model is to a concept as a traditional
Kolmogorov model is to a probability. A Kolmogorovian model
specifies how a probability can be mathematically formalized
independent of the definition of probability that is chosen
(favorable over possible cases, large number limit of frequencies,
subjective, etc.). Analogously, the quantum-theoretic framework
for concepts enables mathematical modeling of conceptual
entities independent of the definition that is adopted in a specific
concept theory (prototype, exemplar, theory, etc.).
We conclude with an epistemological consideration. The
quantum-theoretic framework presented here constitutes a step
toward the elaboration of a general theory for the representation
of any conceptual entity. Hence, it is not just a “cognitive model
for typicality, membership weight or membership probability.”
Rather, we are investigating whether “quantum theory, in its
Hilbert space formulation, is an appropriate theory to model
human cognition.” To understand what we mean by this let us
consider an example taken from everyday life. As an example
of a theory, we could introduce the theory of “how to make
good clothes.” A tailor needs to learn how to make good
clothes for different types of people, men, women, children,
old people, etc. Each cloth is a model in itself. Then, one can
also consider intermediate situations where one has models of
series of clothes. A specific body will not fit in any clothes: you
need to adjust the parameters (length, size, etc.) to reach the
desired fit. We think that a theory should be able to reproduce
different experimental results by suitably adjusting the involved
parameters, exactly as a theory of clothing. This is different from
a set of models, even if the set can cope with a wide range of
data.
There is a tendency, mainly in empirically-based disciplines,
to be critical with respect to a theory that can cope with all
possible situations it applies to. This is because the theory
contains too many parameters, which may lead one to think
that “any type of data can be modeled by allowing all these
parameters to have different values.” We agree that, in case
we have to do with an “ad-hoc model,” i.e., a model specially
made for the circumstance of the situation it models, this
suspicion is grounded. Adding parameters to such an ad-hoc
model, or stretching the already contained parameters to other
values, does not give rise to what we call a theory. On the
other hand, a theory needs to be well defined, its rules, the
allowed procedures, its theoretical, mathematical, and internal
logical structure, “independent” of the structure of the models
describing specific situations that can be coped with by the
theory. Hence also the theory needs to contain a well defined
description of “how to produce models for specific situations.”
Coming back to the theory of clothing, if a tailor knows the theory
of clothing, obviously he or she canmake a cloth for every human
body, because the theory of clothing, although its structure is
defined independently of a specific cloth, contains a prescription
of how to apply it to any possible specific cloth. In this respect,
we think that one should carefully distinguish between a model
that is derived by a general theory, as the one presented in this
paper, and a model specifically designed to test a number of
experimental situations.
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This brings us to the important question of the “predictive
power” of existing quantum-theoretic models. Models derived
from a theory will generally need more data from a bigger
set of experiments to become predictive for the outcomes of
other not yet performed experiments than this is the case for
models that are more ad-hoc. The reason is that in principle
such models—think of the analogy we present with the theory of
clothing above—must be able to faithfully represent the data of
all possible experiments that can be performed on the conceptual
entity in the same state. A tailor knowing the theory of clothing
can in principle make clothes for all human bodies but hence
also predicts outcomes of not performed experiments, e.g., the
measure of a specific part of the cloth, if enough data of a
set of experiments are available to the tailor, e.g., data that
determine the possible types of clothes still fitting these data
and as a consequence also determine the measure of this part
of the clothe. In general in quantum cognition, the scarcity of
data is preventing models from having systematic and substantial
predictive power. One can wonder, if predictive power is not
yet predominantly available in the majority of existing quantum-
theoretic models, why so much attention and value is actually
attributed to them? Answering this question allows us to clarify
an aspect of quantum cognition that is not obvious and even
makes it special in a specific way, at least provisionally until
more data is available. The success of quantum cognition is due
to it “being able to convincingly model data that theoretically
can be proven to be impossible to model with any model that
relies on classical fuzzy set theory and/or classical Kolmogorovian
probability theory.” Hence, a different criterion than predictive
power is provisionally used to identify the success of quantum
cognition. Of course, as soon as more data are collected, the
models will also be able to be tested for their predictive power.
Recent work in quantum cognition is starting to reach the
level of being predictive, for example study of order effects
(Wang et al., 2014), and an elaboration and refinement of
the model presented in this article (Aerts et al., 2015a,c). The
latter model simultaneously investigates the “conjuntion” and
the “negation” of concepts, starting from data collected on such
conceptual combinations. To explain the exact nature and also
accurateness of the predictive power we gained in the model
in Aerts et al. (2015a,c), consider the following mathematical
expression
IABA′B′ = 1−µ(A andB)−µ(A andB′)−µ(A′ andB)−µ(A′ andB′)
(65)
where A and B are the concepts Fruits and Vegetables,
respectively, while A′ and B′ are their negations. Thus, “A and
B′” means Fruits and not Vegetables, while “A′ and B” means
not Fruits and Vegetables and “A′ and B′” means not Fruits and
not Vegetables. In Aerts et al. (2015a,c) we published the data
for the outcomes of experiments that test the membership of the
same 24 items which we considered in the present article, but this
time not only for the conjunction of A and B, but also for the
conjunctions “A and B′,” “A′ and B,” and “A′ and B′.” Suppose
that the data follow a classical probabilistic structure, then IABA′B′
has to be theoretically equal to zero for each considered item, and
this purely follows from a general “law of probability calculus”
related to the so called “de Morgan laws” of classical probability.
This means that, under the hypothesis of a classical probabilistic
structure, if we measure the relative frequencies of “A and B,”
“A and B′” and “A′ and B,” and hence determine experimentally
the values of µ(A and B), µ(A and B′) and µ(A′ and B),
a “prediction” for µ(A′ and B′) can be made theoretically,
namely,
µ(A′ and B′) = 1−µ(A and B)−µ(A and B′)−µ(A′ and B) (66)
for each considered item. Let is explain what are our findings
in Aerts et al. (2015a,c) that make it possible for us to speak
of some specific type of predictability for the more elaborated
and refined model we developed for the combination of concepts
and their negations. In Aerts et al. (2015a,c) we have collected
data not only for the pair of concepts Fruits and Vegetables
and the 24 items treated also in the present article, but for
three more pairs of concepts, and for each of them again 24
items. Due to the already identified non classical nature of
overextension of the conjunction we expected that IABA′B′ would
not be equal to zero, and that indeed showed to be the case.
However, we detected a high level of systematics of the value
of IABA′B′ fluctuating around an average of −0.81. A statistical
analysis showed the different values for individual items to be
possible to be explained as fluctuations around this average
(see Tables 1–4 in Aerts et al., 2015a). Next to the detailed
statistical analysis to be found in Aerts et al. (2015a) we also put
forward a theoretical explanation of this value. The elaborated
and refined model for concept combinations developed in Aerts
et al. (2015a) introduces within the model the combination of
a pure quantum model and a classical model. It can be shown
that for a pure quantum model the value of IABA′B′ would be
−1. We also find that the quantum effects are dominant as
compared to the classical effects in case concepts are combined,
which explains why our refined model gives rise to a value of
IABA′B′ in between the classical one, which is 0, and the pure
quantum one, which is−1, but closer to the quantum one, hence
−0.81. This finding can be turned into a predictive one in the
following way. Suppose we measure µ(A and B), µ(A and B′)
and µ(A′ and B) for two arbitrary concepts and an item. Our
model allows us to put forward the following prediction for
µ(A′ and B′)
µ(A′ and B′) = 1.81−µ(A and B)−µ(A and B′)−µ(A′ and B)
(67)
By comparing Equations (66) and (67), we get that the
quantum-theoretic model in Aerts et al. (2015a) provides
a “different prediction” from a classical probabilistic model
satisfying the axioms of Kolmogorov, and experiments
confirm the validity of the former over the latter. We
add that the quantum model has different predictions
from a classical model also for the values of other
functions than IABA′B′ , and these predictions are “parameter
independent,” in the sense that they do not depend on
the values of free parameters that may accommodate the
data.
The results above can be considered as a strong
confirmation that quantum-theoretic models of concept
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combinations provide predictions that deviate, in
some situations, from the predictions of classical
Kolmogorovian models, which is confirmed by experimental
data.
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APPENDIX
A. Quantum Mathematics for Conceptual
Modeling
We illustrate in this section how the mathematical formalism
of quantum theory can be applied to model situations outside
the microscopic quantum world, more specifically, in the
representation of concepts and their combinations. We will limit
technicalities to the essential.
When the quantum mechanical formalism is applied for
modeling purposes, each considered entity—in our case a
concept—is associated with a complex Hilbert spaceH, that is, a
vector space over the field C of complex numbers, equipped with
an inner product 〈·|·〉 that maps two vectors 〈A| and |B〉 onto a
complex number 〈A|B〉. We denote vectors by using the bra-ket
notation introduced by Paul Adrien Dirac, one of the pioneers of
quantum theory. Vectors can be “kets,” denoted by |A〉, |B〉, or
“bras,” denoted by 〈A|, 〈B|. The inner product between the ket
vectors |A〉 and |B〉, or the bra-vectors 〈A| and 〈B|, is realized by
juxtaposing the bra vector 〈A| and the ket vector |B〉, and 〈A|B〉 is
also called a “bra-ket,” and it satisfies the following properties:
(i) 〈A|A〉 ≥ 0;
(ii) 〈A|B〉 = 〈B|A〉∗, where 〈B|A〉∗ is the complex conjugate of
〈A|B〉;
(iii) 〈A|(z|B〉 + t|C〉) = z〈A|B〉 + t〈A|C〉, for z, t ∈ C, where the
sum vector z|B〉 + t|C〉 is called a “superposition” of vectors
|B〉 and |C〉 in the quantum jargon.
From (ii) and (iii) follows that inner product 〈·|·〉 is linear in the
ket and anti-linear in the bra, i.e., (z〈A| + t〈B|)|C〉 = z∗〈A|C〉 +
t∗〈B|C〉.
The “absolute value” of a complex number is defined as the
square root of the product of this complex number times its
complex conjugate, that is, |z| = √z∗z. Moreover, a complex
number z can either be decomposed into its cartesian form z =
x + iy, or into its polar form z = |z|eiθ = |z|(cos θ + i sin θ).
As a consequence, we have |〈A|B〉| = √〈A|B〉〈B|A〉. We define
the “length” of a ket (bra) vector |A〉 (〈A|) as |||A〉|| = ||〈A||| =√〈A|A〉. A vector of unitary length is called a “unit vector.” We
say that the ket vectors |A〉 and |B〉 are “orthogonal” and write
|A〉 ⊥ |B〉 if 〈A|B〉 = 0.
We have now introduced the necessary mathematics
to state the first modeling rule of quantum theory, as
follows.
A.1. First Quantum Modeling Rule
A state A of an entity—in our case a concept—modeled by
quantum theory is represented by a ket vector |A〉 with length
1, that is 〈A|A〉 = 1.
An orthogonal projectionM is a linear operator on the Hilbert
space, that is, a mapping M : H → H, |A〉 7→ M|A〉 which
is Hermitian and idempotent. The latter means that, for every
|A〉, |B〉 ∈ H and z, t ∈ C, we have:
(i) M(z|A〉 + t|B〉) = zM|A〉 + tM|B〉 (linearity);
(ii) 〈A|M|B〉 = 〈B|M|A〉∗ (hermiticity);
(iii) M ·M = M (idempotency).
The identity operator 1 maps each vector onto itself and is
a trivial orthogonal projection. We say that two orthogonal
projections Mk and Ml are orthogonal operators if each vector
contained in Mk(H) is orthogonal to each vector contained in
Ml(H), and we write Mk ⊥ Ml, in this case. The orthogonality
of the projection operators Mk and Ml can also be expressed by
MkMl = 0, where 0 is the null operator. A set of orthogonal
projection operators {Mk |k = 1, . . . , n} is called a “spectral
family” if all projectors are mutually orthogonal, that is,Mk ⊥ Ml
for k 6= l, and their sum is the identity, that is,∑nk= 1Mk = 1.
The above definitions give us the necessary mathematics to
state the second modeling rule of quantum theory, as follows.
A.2. Second Quantum Modeling Rule
A measurable quantity Q of an entity—in our case a concept—
modeled by quantum theory, and having a set of possible real
values {q1, . . . , qn} is represented by a spectral family {Mk |k =
1, . . . , n} in the following way. If the entity—in our case a
concept—is in a state represented by the vector |A〉, then the
probability of obtaining the value qk in a measurement of the
measurable quantity Q is 〈A|Mk|A〉 = ||Mk|A〉||2. This formula
is called the “Born rule” in the quantum jargon. Moreover,
if the value qk is actually obtained in the measurement, then
the initial state is changed into a state represented by the
vector
|Ak〉 =
Mk|A〉
||Mk|A〉||
(A1)
This change of state is called “collapse” in the quantum jargon.
The tensor productHA⊗HB of twoHilbert spacesHA andHB
is the Hilbert space generated by the set {|Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉}, where |Ai〉
and |Bj〉 are vectors ofHA andHB, respectively, whichmeans that
a general vector of this tensor product is of the form
∑
ij |Ai〉 ⊗
|Bj〉. This gives us the necessary mathematics to introduce the
third modeling rule.
A.3. Third Quantum Modeling Rule
A state C of a compound entity—in our case a combined
concept—is represented by a unit vector |C〉 of the tensor product
HA ⊗ HB of the two Hilbert spaces HA and HB containing
the vectors that represent the states of the component entities—
concepts.
The above means that we have |C〉 = ∑ij cij|Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉,
where |Ai〉 and |Bj〉 are unit vectors of HA and HB, respectively,
and
∑
i,j |cij|2 = 1. We say that the state C represented by
|C〉 is a product state if it is of the form |A〉 ⊗ |B〉 for some
|A〉 ∈ HA and |B〉 ∈ HB. Otherwise, C is called an “entangled
state.”
The Fock space is a specific type of Hilbert space, originally
introduced in quantum field theory. For most states of a quantum
field the number of identical quantum entities is not conserved
but is a variable quantity. The Fock space copes with this
situation in allowing its vectors to be superpositions of vectors
pertaining to different sectors for fixed numbers of identical
quantum entities. MoreA explicitly, the k-th sector of a Aock
space describes a fixed number of k identical quantum entities,
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and it is of the form H ⊗ . . . ⊗ H of the tensor product of k
identical Hilbert spaces H. The Aock space A itself is the direct
sum of all these sectors, hence
A = ⊕j
k= 1 ⊗kl= 1 H (A2)
Aor our modeling we have only used Aock space for the “two”
and “one quantum entity” case, hence A = H ⊕ (H ⊗ H). This
is due to considering only combinations of two concepts. The
sector H is called the “first sector,” while the sector H ⊗ H is
called the “second sector.” A unit vector |F〉 ∈ F is then written
as |F〉 = neiγ |C〉 + meiδ(|A〉 ⊗ |B〉), where |A〉, |B〉 and |C〉 are
unit vectors ofH, and such that n2 +m2 = 1. For combinations
of j concepts, the general form of Fock space in Equation (A2)
should be used.
The quantum modeling above can be generalized by allowing
states to be represented by the so called “density operators”
and measurements to be represented by the so called “positive
operator valued measures.” However, for the sake of brevity we
will not dwell on this extension here.
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